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DEFINING THE ROLE OF
COMMODITIES REGULATORS
Brian P. Volkman*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1996, a copper scandal involving Sumitomo Corporation exposed
glaring vulnerabilities resulting from the quality of the regulation of
commodities markets. Yet the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC"), which regulates the United States commodities markets, had
been criticized for years by other financial regulators as well as by market
participants that believe that the CFTC subjects commodities markets to
excessive regulation. The Commodities Exchange Act requires Congress
to periodically evaluate commodities regulation and reauthorize the CFTC.
The current authorization for the CFTC expires at the end of fiscal year
2000. Congress began the process to reauthorize the CFTC beyond 2000
early this year.
This article assesses the current framework for commodities regulation
and analyzes arguments for regulatory reform. Part II describes three
instances of commodities market manipulation: one instance of manipulation
before the commodities markets were regulated and two relatively recent
market disruptions. Part III explains the current regulatory debate. Part IV
considers the reasons that governments regulate the commodity markets.
Part V describes recent efforts to define the scope of the commodities
regulators' authority. Finally, Part VI explains the importance of accepting
the parameters of today's global markets and the responsibility of Congress
to balance market integrity and market growth during the current
reauthorization of the CFTC.

* M.S., Adelphi University School of Banking; J.D., New York Law School. The
author is Vice President and Compliance Officer for the New York branch of Bayerische
Landesbank. The views expressed are solely those of the author.
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H. THREE SCANDALS IN THE COMMODITIES MARKETS
A. United Metals
During the first nine months of 1907, the supply of copper in the
United States was unusually tight. Between April and August, the United
Metals Selling Corporation usually sold 150 to 200 million pounds of
copper, but during that period in 1907, it sold only five million pounds.'
Then, in October 1907, United Metals sold ninety-three million pounds of
copper, and the price of the metal and of copper mining stocks plummeted.2
Although people suspected that United Metals was manipulating the market,
it insisted that its sales activity merely reflected irregular fluctuations in the
demand for copper. 3
One victim of the rapid devaluation of copper mining stocks was F.
Augustus Heinze, president of United Copper and Mercantile National
Bank. 4 During 1907, Mr. Heinze had acquired a significant interest in
United Copper's stock.5 When United Metals flooded the market with
copper in October, Mr. Heinze expected investors to short-sell stock in
United Copper in anticipation of a fall in the price of the stock.6 He
ordered his brokers to continue buying the stock, thinking that if he owned
enough shares of United Copper, he could force the short sellers to buy
from him at an artificially high price when the time came for them to cover
their positions. 7 Unfortunately for him, Mr. Heinze overestimated the

1. See Ellis W. Tallman & Jon R. Moen, Lessons From the Panic of 1907, ECON. REV.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.

5. See id.at 6.
6. A "short sale" occurs when an investor believes that the market price of a stock is
overvalued, borrows shares of the stock, and then sells the borrowed shares. The investor
expects the value of the shares to fall below the price for which he sold them. If this

happens, then the investor will realize a profit when he covers his position by buying shares
at the depressed market price. An investor who owns a controlling interest in a shorted
stock can "squeeze the shorts" when the time comes for the short sellers to cover their

positions if the short sellers cannot find enough shares to cover their obligations without
buying from the controlling shareholder. In the case of United Copper, Mr. Heinze
attempted to "squeeze the shorts," but there were few shorts to squeeze. See id. at 6. For
a detailed explanation of short sales, see BENTON E. Gup, THE BASICS OF INVESTING 167,
339 (5th ed. 1992).
7. See Tallman & Moen, supra note 1, at 5.
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volume of short selling in United Copper's stock. 8 When the value of
United Copper's stock dropped, Mr. Heinze was unable to force buyers to
pay above-market prices for his shares in order to cover their short sales. 9
As the value of Mr. Heinze's investment deteriorated, the public
became concerned about his ties to the New York banking industry. 10
Besides being president of Mercantile National, Mr. Heinze was a director
of a number of banks and trust companies, and had influential friends in the
industry." Depositors withdrew funds from his bank and from the banks
and trust companies of those associated with him. 12 The run on banks and
trust companies in New York strained their ability to fund stock market
trading. Activity on the New York Stock Exchange nearly came to a halt
until J.P. Morgan arranged a fund to support the troubled institutions. 13
B. Metallgesellschaft
Today, the financial markets and our mechanisms for regulating them
are significantly more mature than in 1907. In the United States, the
Federal Reserve System and the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC")
share responsibility for the safety and soundness of the banking industry, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") insures the public's retail
bank deposits, and the Commodities Futures Exchange Commission
("CFTC") regulates the U.S. commodities markets. Given the roles of the
Federal Reserve, the OCC, the FDIC, and the CFTC, it is unlikely that a
simple market manipulation could still trigger a widespread bank panic.
However, spectacular trading losses can still unnerve the market.
Toward the end of 1993, Germany's Metallgesellschaft learned
firsthand that a crisis at one firm can threaten the stability of the
commodities markets. In December 1992, Metallgesellschaft signed a
security agreement guaranteeing the trading obligations of its U.S.
subsidiaries, but according to the CFTC, it did not accurately measure its
exposure. '
During the early nineties, U.S. subsidiaries of
Metallgesellschaft purchased substantial amounts of short-term oil futures

8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 4.
11. Seeid. at5.
12. See id. at 4.
13. See id. at 8.
14. See In re MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc. & MG Futures, Inc., No. 95-14, 1995 WL 447455,
at *4 (C.F.T.C. July 27, 1995).
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contracts to hedge against long-term supply contracts that they entered into5
with independent gasoline stations and heating oil distributors.
Approximately one-third of the short-term futures contracts were purchased
on the New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX"). 16 The balance were
privately negotiated contracts. 17 All of the long term supply contracts were
off-exchange, privately-negotiated contracts.1 8 When oil prices dropped in
the fall of 1993, one subsidiary, MG Futures, had open positions 9 covering
160 million° barrels of oil, including 55 million that were traded on the
NYMEX. 20

In November 1993, oil prices approached their lowest level in three
years.2' The prices fell below those at which MG Futures was obligated on
its futures contracts. 2 The NYMEX required MG Futures to supply
increasing amounts of margin, and MG Futures solicited Metallgesellschaft
for funding.23 As the margin calls escalated, Metallgesellschaft became
reluctant to continue supporting the position of MG Futures. 24 During the
first week of December 1993, Metallgesellschaft sought the aid of the CFTC
and the NYMEX in liquidating the contracts. 25
The CFTC and the NYMEX knew that timing the liquidation would be
critical and proceeded with caution.2 6 When a futures contract is liquidated,
the seller, for a price, releases the purchaser from its obligation. A rapid

15. See id. A futures contract fixes a time period, a price, and a quantity. At the end of
the time period the purchaser is obligated to buy the specified quantity at the specified price.
See Economic Purposes of Futures Trading, (last modified Jan. 1997)
< http://www.cftc.gov/opa/brochures/econpurp.html >.
16. See In re MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc. & MG Futures, Inc., 1995 WL 447455, at *4.
17.

c',.-.

d

18. See id.
19. An "open position" in this context is an obligation to purchase pursuant to futures
contracts.
20. See Jeffrey Taylor & Kenneth H. Bacon, How the Nymex Calmed Crisis Over MG's
Oil Trades, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1994, at Cl.
21. See Jack Reerink, Inside the MG Trading Debacle, FUTURES, Apr. 1, 1994, at 58,
availablein 1994 WL 12766370.
22. See id.
23. See id. To mitigate the risk that a trader will not cover a contract that has lost value,
exchanges require traders who are "long" (obligated to buy at a pre-determined price) to
deposit "margin" (funds representing the difference between the contract price and the

market price) when prices drop. See GuP, supra note 5, at 479.
24. See Reerink, supra note 21, at 58.
25. See id.
26. See id.
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liquidation would have weakened the "buy" side of the market and could
have further depressed oil prices, compounding Metallgesellschaft's losses,
and creating losses for others in the market. However, if Metallgesellschaft
voluntarily or involuntarily declared bankruptcy before its positions were
liquidated, it would be excused from performing the contracts that were still
open. To make matters worse, a number of Metallgesellschaft's creditors,
fearing that the company was no longer viable, demanded loan repayments
that would have disrupted an orderly liquidation of the futures contracts. 27
The company delayed paying its creditors and adhered to the scheduled
liquidation of the futures contracts. 28 As a result of the liquidation,
Metallgesellschaft lost more than $1 billion. 29 The losses nearly bankrupted
the company and reminded creditors, exchanges, and market participants of
systemic risk-the fact that the failure of a large international conglomerate
might still trigger a chain reaction of losses.
C. Sumitomo Corporation
Not long after Metallgesellschaft's oil trading losses, signs of a copper
trading scandal similar to the 1907 scandal began to surface. In 1994, the
London Metal Exchange ("LME") leased a warehouse for copper in Long
Beach, California so that U.S. market participants could have easy access
to the metal . 30 However, very little copper ever left the warehouse.3 The
resulting short supply of copper caused its price for immediate delivery (the
"cash" or "spot" price) to exceed its price for future delivery. 32 For many
commodities, cash prices are normally lower than prices for future
delivery. 3 When cash prices are higher than future prices, market
34
participants call the premium for immediate delivery "backwardation."
An unexplained backwardation may act as a signal that someone is trying to
control supplies. On Friday, October 13, 1995, the backwardation
difference between spot and 90-day contracts in copper tripled from $20 to

27. See Taylor & Bacon, supra note 20, at Cl.
28. See id.
29. See Reerink, supra note 21, at 58.
30. See Suzanne McGee & Stephen E. Frank, MetalDetection:Sumitomo Debacle is Tied
to Lax Controls By Firm, Regulators, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1996, at Al.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See Howard L. Simons, BackwardationHas Its Price (andProfits), FUTURES, June
1, 1994, at 36, available in 1994 WL 12766409.
34. See id.
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$60. 35 In light of this increase, members of the LME and its American
counterpart, Commodities Exchange, Inc. ("Comex"), were fairly certain
that somebody was manipulating the market.36
The following Monday, the Wall Street Journal reported that Yasuo
Hamanaka, a trader at Sumitomo Corporation, may have controlled more
than two-thirds of the copper in the Long Beach warehouse.3 7 Like United
Metals in 1907,38 Hamanaka denied that Sumitomo was manipulating the
copper supply. 39 Over the next several months, the CFTC sought
information from the LME to determine who might be in a position to
control the copper supply. 4° The LME was slow to respond to the CFTC's
requests, initially reporting that it did not detect any sign of manipulation.41
However, as backwardation continued through the winter, the LME agreed
to participate in the CFTC's investigation.42
While the CFTC and the LME were investigating copper prices in April
1996, a clerk at Sumitomo Corporation received a bank statement that she
could not reconcile with Sumitomo's records. 43 Sumitomo contacted the
bank and learned that Hamanaka had initiated the transactions reflected on
the statement." Apparently, the transactions were related to Hamanaka's
unauthorized trading in copper. 45 Because of the questions surrounding
Hamanaka, Sumitomo removed him from his position as a copper trader. 6
Several weeks later, Hamanaka confessed to his manager at Sumitomo that
he had been secretly trading copper for nearly ten years and that Sumitomo

35. See Neil Behrmann et al.. 'Saueeze' Rumors Rattle Connper Markets
Oct. 16, 1995, at C1.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
39. Behrmann et al., supra note 35, at C1.
40. McGee & Frank, supra note 30, at Al.

WATL ST. j.

41. See id.

42. See id.
43. See id. Apparently, that undisclosed foreign bank was Union Bank of Switzerland.

See UBS Held 4 Accounts for Sumitomo Copper Trader Hamanaka, AFX NEwS, July 7,
1997, availablein LEXIS, News Library, AFX News.

44. See McGee & Frank, supra note 30, at Al.
45. See id.
46. See In re Sumitomo Corporation, No. 98-14, 1998 WL 236520, at *4 (C.F.T.C.
May 11, 1998).
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controlled a substantial portion of the copper in the Long Beach
warehouse. "
Hamanaka began his unauthorized trading in 1985 to cover up a $20
million trading loss.48 Over the next several years, Sumitomo lost
increasing amounts of money through Hamanaka's speculative trading in the
copper market.49 In late 1993, attempting to recover Sumitomo's losses,
Hamanaka established a relationship with a U.S. copper merchant firm. 50
Their goal was to purchase vast quantities of copper, artificially inflate the
market price of copper, and then liquidate their holdings at a substantial
profit. 51 By late 1995, when the CFTC began investigating copper prices,
Sumitomo and the U.S. copper merchant owned and controlled up to 100%
of LME copper stocks.52
Hamanaka's control of the copper market ended when Sumitomo
removed him from his position in May 1996. 53 At the time, he had not yet
liquidated most of Sumitomo's holdings; it still owned a significant amount
of copper. 54 The day after Hamanaka confessed, copper prices dropped
10%. 55 Market observers suspect that Sumitomo immediately began to
unload its store of copper, driving prices down. 56 Eight days later,
Sumitomo publicly disclosed the extent of its holdings and projected
losses.5 7 Copper prices again fell 10% in a single day. 5 Because of its
47. See McGee & Frank, supra note 30, at Al.

48. See Anatomy of a Debacle: How Sumitomo's Hamanaka Came Undone, AGENCE
17, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 2060745.
49. See id. For example, in 1994 Hamanaka lost $253 million by writing $150 million
of combined put and call options in favor of Morgan Guaranty. This strategy, known as a
FRANCE-PRESSE, Feb.

"top straddle," was one of the strategies used by Nicholas Leeson when his futures trading

bankrupted his employer, Barings, PLC in 1995. Writing a combination of put and call
options is risky because the writer gives the other party to the options the right to either sell
or buy. Unless the writer hedges its position, the writer will lose money if the price of the
underlying commodity either rises or falls beyond a narrow range. For information
regarding "top straddles", see HAL S. SCOTT AND PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 1010-11 (4th ed. 1997).

50. See In re Sumitomo Corporation, 1998 WL 236520, at *4.
51. Seeid.

52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.

55. See McGee & Frank, supra note 30, at Al.
56. See id.
57. See Fred Vogelstein & Neil Behrmann, Market Struggles to Sort Out Sumitomo Mess:

Copper Traders See Volatility Amid Scandal, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1996, at C1.
58. See id.
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large holdings and the rapid decrease in prices, Sumitomo's losses were
enormous. In the end, Sumitomo reported a $2.6 billion loss as a result of
the copper trading scandal. 9
Sumitomo was not the only victim of Hamanaka's fraudulent trading.
Many banks and other large market participants that had sold put options to
copper producers suffered from the rapid decline in prices. 6° In this
context, a "put" is an option that a financial intermediary sells to a
commodity producer, promising to buy a certain amount of the commodity
from the producer at a set price on a future date. 6 1 A dealer that sells a put
expects that prices will remain stable or will not fall below the exercise price
for the put, in which case the dealer can collect the option fee without
having to actually perform on the contract. However, if the market falls
below the exercise price, producers that bought puts will exercise their
options to sell their products to the dealers at higher prices than the market
price. To offset this risk, dealers typically use a "dynamic" hedging
strategy in which they sell copper futures contracts or buy call options. 62
However, in a rapidly declining market, dealers face losses even if they
have hedged their positions because dynamic hedging can be difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve in a market that has become illiquid due to an
unpredictable fall in prices.63 Dealers that had sold put options on copper
in the spring of 1996 faced significant losses after Sumitomo's copper
scandal sent the market into a tailspin. 64
I. A REGULATORY CROSSROADS
Each of these three commodity trading scandals-United Metals in
1907, Metallgesellschaft in 1993, and Sumitomo in 1996-had a profound
ipact on financial regulation. After the bank panic that followed the
United Metals market manipulation, the Federal Government held hearings
which determined that the country needed a central source for assessing the
stability of the banking industry. 65 The hearings ultimately were influential

59. In re Sumitomo Corporation, 1998 WL 236520, at *4.
60. See Andrew Barry, Dealers Who Loaded Up on Puts Holding Bag in Sumitomo
Debacle, BARRON'S, June 17, 1996, at MW 12.
61. See Economic Purposesof FuturesTrading, (last modified Jan. 1997) <http://www.
cftc.gov/opalbrochures/econpurp.html >.
62. See Barry, supra note 60, at MW 12.

63. See id.
64. See id.

65. See Tallman & Moen, supra note 1, at 2.
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in leading Congress to establish the Federal Reserve System-a first step
toward building the supervision of the financial markets that we have today
in the United States. 66
In response to Metallgesellschaft's 1993 oil contracts trading dilemma,
the CFTC fined MG Futures and a second U.S. subsidiary, MG Refining
and Marketing, $2.25 million.6 7 Significantly, the CFTC also required them
to strengthen their internal controls, and declared their off-exchange supply
contracts illegal and void. 68 The CFTC's regulatory action against
Metallgesellschaft was criticized by market participants and legislators alike.
Market participants questioned the CFTC's authority to regulate internal
controls, but they were primarily concerned with the legality of the offexchange contracts. 69 Some observers believed that, by rendering the
contracts void, the CFTC was challenging the entire off-exchange interbank
swaps market. 70 The CFTC assured Congress that it did not intend to
disrupt the off-exchange market, 7' but certain members of Congress wanted
to rein in its regulatory authority. Early in 1997, Congressman Ewing
introduced amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act in the House of
7
Representatives 72 and Senator Lugar introduced a similar bill in the Senate .
Both bills sought to significantly reduce the CFTC's regulatory authority.
Although neither bill became law, together they set the stage for a dramatic
dispute regarding commodities regulation.
As Congress considered narrower authority for the CFTC, commodity
regulators around the world questioned the adequacy of their regulatory
systems in light of the Sumitomo debacle. In November 1996, regulators
from seventeen countries met in London to discuss global standards for
commodities regulation.74 They agreed to develop standards for contract

66. See id.
67. See In re MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc. & MG Futures, Inc., No. 95-14, 1995 WL 447455,
at *4 (C.F.T.C. July 27, 1995).
68. See id. In general, a contract for the sale of a commodity for future delivery must be
traded on a CFTC-designated contract market unless the CFTC grants an exemption. In
1993, the CFTC exempted swap contracts from the off-exchange prohibition, but only if the
contract is privately negotiated between certain types of financially sophisticated parties.
69. See Swaps in Danger, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1995, at A10. See also Merton H.
Miller & Christopher L. Culp, Rein in the CFTC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1995, at A10.
70. See Justin Fox, FuturesAgency DeniesIntentionof Regulating OTCDerivatives,AM.
BANKER, Jan. 23, 1996, at 2.
71. See id.
72. H.R. 467, 105th Cong. (1997).
73. S. 257, 105th Cong. (1997).
74. See Nancy E. Kelly, CFTC's Born Sees a World of Tasks to Tackle, AM.

METAL
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design, market surveillance, and information sharing." In October 1997,
the regulators reconvened in Tokyo and issued a Communiqud that endorsed
a set of best practices for regulatory cooperation, and for overseeing
contract development and market activity ("Best Practices"). 76 The
regulatory authorities that participated in the conference agreed to share
surveillance information about large exposures with each other and to
encourage their own governments to remove domestic obstacles to obtaining
and sharing such information.77
Despite global efforts to coordinate and strengthen oversight of the
commodities markets, many in the U.S. oppose a more active role for the
CFTC. In May 1998, the CFTC issued its Concept Release regarding
Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives .78 The release sought public comment
on a number of issues relating to the rapidly expanding off-exchange market
for financial derivatives . 79 The CFTC's regulations presently govern
exchange-traded contracts, but off-exchange contracts are generally
unregulated.80 The CFTC presented its concept release as a neutral request
for comments, but to many people-who had already seen the CFTC declare
Metallgesellschaft's off exchange contracts void-it implied that the CFTC
intended to regulate the off-exchange derivatives market. Afraid that legal
uncertainty would drive the OTC derivatives market offshore, the U.S.
Treasury Secretary, the Federal Reserve chairman, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) chairman each petitioned Congress for
emergency legislation to prevent the CFTC from regulating the OTC
market."'
Throughout the summer of 1998, committees of the U.S. Senate and
House of Representatives held hearings about the CFTC's concept release. 82

Dec. 12, 1996, at 4.
75. See id.
76. See COMMODITY FUTURES

MARKET,

TRADING COMMISSION, TOKYO COMMODITY FUTURES
MARKETS REGULATORS' CONFERENCE 3 (1997) [hereinafter TOKYO CONFERENCE].

77. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Commodity Derivatives Regulators

Publish Guidance on Strengthening the Supervision of InternationalMarkets (last modified
Oct. 31, 1997) <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press97/4072-97.htm>.
78. Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1998).

79. Id. at 26,115.
80. Id. at 26,114.
81. See Regulationof the Over-the-CounterDerivativesMarket, 1998: Hearings on H.R.
467 Before the Subcomm. on Risk Management and Specialty Crops of the House Comm.
on Agric., 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Subcomm. Hearings].
82. The House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture's Subcommittee on Risk
Management and Specialty Crops held a hearing on June 10, 1998. The House of
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The CFTC testified that its concept release merely sought public opinions
about the OTC markets.83 The Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve,
and the SEC testified that the concept release threatened an already fragile
understanding that certain off-exchange contracts are legal and
enforceable. 84 Leaders of the U.S. commodity exchanges and industry
associations presented divergent views regarding the off-exchange market
and the threat, if any, presented by the concept release. 85 In June 1998,
following the first round of hearings, Congressman Leach introduced the
Financial Derivatives Supervisory Improvement Act of 1998 ("HR 4062")
in the House of Representatives. 86 After a second and third round of
hearings, Congressman Smith introduced the Financial Markets Reassurance
Act of 1998 ("HR 4507").87 Both bills sought to restrain the CFTC from
proposing any rule regarding the off-exchange market until after the CFTC
reauthorization process.
Shortly after the hearings, and while the bills were still before various
congressional committees, a financial crisis punctuated the regulatory
debate. Long Term Capital Management ("LTCM") is a hedge fund
manager that borrowed heavily to invest in both on- and off-exchange
contracts. In September 1998, regulators learned that LTCM's capital had
fallen to less than 1% of its securities investments, and they were concerned
that LTCM might default on margin calls.88 To ensure that LTCM would
not default, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York orchestrated a $3.6
billion capital contribution from LTCM's major creditors.89 The bailout left
the regulators contemplating familiar questions regarding off-exchange

Representatives Committee on Banking and Financial Services held a hearing on July 24,
1998. The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry held a hearing on July
30, 1998. See id. See also Over-the-CounterDerivativesMarket, 1998: Hearingson H.R.
4062 Before the Comm. On Banking and Fin. Services, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of
Brooksley Born, Chairperson, CFTC) and Over-the-CounterDerivatives Market, 1998:
HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. On Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 105th Cong. (1998)
[hereinafter Agric. Comm. Hearings] (statement of Brooksley Born, Chairperson, CFTC).
83. See Over-the-CounterDerivatives Market, 1998: Hearingson H.R. 4062 Before the
Comm. On Banking and Fin. Services, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Brooksley Born,
Chairperson, CFTC).
84. See Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 81.

85. Id.
86. H.R. 4062, 105th Cong. (1998).
87. H.R. 4507, 105th Cong. (1998).
88. See Agric. Comm. Hearings, supra note 82, (statement of Brooksley Born,
Chairperson, CFTC).
89. Id.
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regulation. 9° Ultimately, the four regulators (the Treasury, the Federal
Reserve, the SEC, and the CFTC) agreed to conduct a joint study of the offexchange market, 9' and Congress passed legislation to restrain CFTC
regulation of the off-exchange market for several months while the study
was being conducted.92
The simultaneous efforts to restrain commodities regulation in the
United States and to expand it abroad place commodities regulators at a
crossroads. In seeking effective regulatory infrastructures, many countries
try to emulate the United States because they consider the U.S. markets to
be particularly efficient and a universal model. Meanwhile, the United
States is trying to recapture market share by emulating the more narrow
During the current
regulation practiced in other jurisdictions.
reauthorization process, Congress may restructure the law governing the
U.S. commodity markets. The following sections will analyze the various
reasons to regulate commodity markets, assess the performance of existing
commodities regulation, and weigh the sometimes competing interests of
integrity and growth in the marketplace.
IV.

WHY REGULATE THE COMMODITIES MARKETS?

A. Identifying the Participants

The natural purpose of a commodities market is to facilitate trade in
commodities. 93 A commodities market has three types of participants:
suppliers of commodities, users of commodities, and financial
intermediaries. 9 These participants use commodities exchanges to buy and
sell commodities, or to trade options or contracts covering commodities.9'
)U}J

liiusennnc commod

y e..hage. ,, i

nr

,nrcr

part., O ensOure)4
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their products at a predictable price in the future, while purchasers use the

90. Id.
91. See Agric. Comm. Hearings, supra note 82 (statement of Barbara P. Holum,
Commissioner, CFTC).
92. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, § 760, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999).
93. The Commodity Exchange Act broadly defines "commodity" to include a list of
agricultural products and "all other goods and articles, except onions.., and all services,
rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt

in." 7 U.S.C. § l(a)(3) (1994). More generally, commodities include metals, minerals,
hydrocarbons, and agricultural, and financial products.
94. See Economic Purposes of Futures Trading, supra note 61.

95. See id.
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same exchanges, in part, to ensure predictable prices for the products they
need to purchase in the future. 96 Suppliers and purchasers will use a
commodity exchange if they are confident that the contracts traded on the
exchange will be honored and reflect an accurate assessment of market
conditions. 97
As Section II revealed, market participants sometimes attempt to
manipulate a market by controlling supplies and maintaining artificially high
prices. Mr. Heinze of United Copper (a supplier) tried this technique in
1907,98 and Mr. Hamanaka of Sumitomo Corporation (a financial
intermediary) tried it during the early 1990's. 99
To complicate matters, the third group of market participants, financial
intermediaries, sometimes trade on commodity exchanges not because they
need to buy or sell a particular product, but because they believe that, on the
basis of their understanding of market conditions, they can take profitable
positions in the market. In such cases, they wish to use their understanding
to exploit what they perceive to be opportunities to profit in the market, and
are said to play the role of speculators.
Speculators can stabilize a market. For example, a speculator who
buys a particular commodity believing that its supply will drop in the future,
may intend to withhold the commodity from current consumption when the
supply is adequate and sell it in the future when the supply is inadequate.
The practice of withholding a commodity which is abundant in order to sell
it when it is scarce stabilizes the market for the commodity. 100 However,
when a speculator's predictions turn out to be wrong, the resulting losses
sometimes disrupt the market. During 1993, U.S. subsidiaries of
Metallgesellschaft wrongly predicted that oil prices would rise, and their
substantial obligations on oil contracts nearly caused a financial crisis when
oil prices dropped.' 0
A market disruption can cause participants to question whether their
contracts accurately reflect market conditions, or whether the contracts
reflect some activity that is distorting the true state of the market. A shock
to market confidence can affect trading volume. For example, after
Sumitomo announced its massive copper trading losses in 1996, the volume
of copper futures trading on both the LME and the New York Mercantile

96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See supra note I and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
100. See GuP, supra note 6, at 469.
101. See In re MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc. & MG Futures, Inc., supra note 14, at *2.
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Exchange declined. 1o2 Trading remained slow into the summer of 1997.103
In May 1997, metals analyst Alan Williamson of Deutsche Morgan Grenfell
in London commented that "[c]ertainly, the speculative community (i.e.,
position-taking intermediaries) hasn't wanted to play the copper market. "14
Since unstable markets can adversely affect commerce and economic
conditions in general, governments tend to believe that a stable commodities
market serves the public interest.' °5 They regulate their commodity
exchanges so that they can play a role in instilling confidence in the
markets. As the commodity markets evolve in various jurisdictions,
governments adjust their regulatory frameworks, but the proper scope and
source of regulation are a source of enduring controversy.
B. Protecting SophisticatedInvestors-The Need to Assure
Market Confidencefor Individual Firms,
Local Markets, and Global Markets
One long-standing principle of financial regulation is that professional
market participants do not require as much regulatory protection as do less
sophisticated individual investors. For example, when the United States
first established its deposit insurance system for commercial banks in 1933,
the insurance limit was set at $2,500.106 This low ceiling was intended to
protect consumer deposits and prevent runs on banks.107 It recognized that
large depositors, who in many cases are large corporations or other banks,
are better able to assess the condition of their banks than the average
consumer.10 8 In the commodities markets, rules designed to protect a
farmer who sells a put option on wheat may not be necessary to protect a
sophisticated dealer that trades financial contracts. In fact, the idea behind
Cur.lL.iL proposa..)ls
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that transactions between sophisticated traders should be exempt from most
CFTC regulations.
102. See Aaron Luchetti, Trading Scandal Still Haunts Copper Markets, WALL ST. J.,
May 27, 1997, at C1.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Section 3 of the Commodity Exchange Act describes how transactions in
commodities are "affected with a national public interest." 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
106. See CARTER H. GOLEMBE AND DAVID S. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF
BANKING 117 (1986). The limit is currently $100,000. See id.
107. See A. Rosch, Too Big to Fail:Origins and Consequences, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
ATLANTA ECON. REV., March/April 1991, at 8.

108. See id.
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There are however, limits on the ability of private parties to uncover
fraud. Large corporations and sophisticated traders lack the regulatory and
investigative powers of a government agency. And, notwithstanding their
size, they are vulnerable to the turbulence that may affect markets when
large frauds are uncovered. While consumer protection is a significant
objective of financial regulation, market confidence is an even more
fundamental goal of regulation that reaches beyond consumer-orientated
markets. The drop in the volume of copper futures trading following the
Sumitomo scandal' °9 illustrates the need for market confidence. As
discussed, market participants trade futures contracts in part to stabilize the
prices they will pay or receive in the future. But after a market shock that
causes participants to question the basis for the contracts, many of those
participants may take their chances on future prices rather than enter into
contracts that they perceive to be unreliable.
The so-called "Japanese premium"110 illustrates the costs of sacrificing
market confidence. In late 1995, following a string of rescues and scandals
involving Japanese banks, most notably Daiwa's bond trading scandal in
New York, lenders in the international funds markets lost confidence in the
Japanese banking industry and charged Japanese banks a premium for funds
(both yen and U.S. dollars) above the rates charged to non-Japanese
banks. 'l The premium hurt an already ailing Japanese banking market,
causing many Japanese banks to scale down their international business, and
causing some of their customers to use foreign banks for financing." 2
Efforts by emerging market countries to adopt global standards for
bank regulation demonstrate that many countries recognize the value of
market confidence. The Basle Committee on Bank Supervision is a
committee of banking supervisory authorities.113 In September 1997, it
issued Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision ("Core

109. See Vogelstein & Behrmann, supra note 57, at C1.
110. See Robert Steiner, Now the Banks must Pay Premium to Borrow Yen in
InternationalMarkets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1995, at A21. See also Horrible Truth
Revealed, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 1997, at 65. [Hereinafter Horrible Truth]
111. See Steiner, supra note 110.
112. For example, Sumitomo Corporation turned to foreign banks, including American

banks, for financing when the so-called Japanese Premium made it difficult for Japanese
banks to offer competitive financing. See The Sumitomo Copper Trading Scandal: The
Japanese Context: Hearing Before the House Banking Comm., 104th Cong. (1996)
(statement of Douglas Ostrom, Senior Economist, Japan Economic Institute of America).
113. The committee currently consists of senior representatives of banking supervisory
authorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,

Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Principles") which set forth twenty-five basic concepts for establishing and
maintaining a stable banking market. "4 The premise of the Core Principles
is that by adopting a regulatory framework that meets certain global
standards, bank supervisors can create a basis for global confidence in the
banks that they supervise.11 5 In addition to the twelve states that are
members of the Basle Committee, sixteen non-member countries
authorities
participated in developing the Core Principles, and supervisory
6
around the world have been invited to adopt them. "
The recent expansion of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD") also illustrates the emphasis that certain
emerging market countries place on market confidence. The OECD exists
to promote compatible economic and social policies among its member
countries in order to foster economic growth and financial stability.1 1 7 To
be eligible for OECD membership, a country must develop policies and
regulations that are consistent with the OECD goals of growth and stability.
Several countries have recently been admitted to, applied to, or expressed
an interest in the OECD. South Korea, Poland, and Hungary are the
countries most recently admitted to the OECD. 8 Status as an OECDmember could enhance a country's investment, finance, and trade
opportunities because of enhanced market confidence in that country.
Given the separate goals of consumer protection and market confidence,
an evaluation of the appropriate scope of regulation for the commodities
markets must first identify the market's participants, its risks, and the
potential victims if those risks materialize. In a September 1996 editorial,
The Wall Street Journalpointed out that Sumitomo is a Japanese company,
Yasuo Hamanaka was based in Tokyo, and his trading was largely
9 The
conducted
on the LME in London rather than on a U.S. exchange."
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VcIR'ninr-i a11lliitll
Cultollil ab~ulm thaw~t the
1
114UIk~lll
no /- _ll
110
i~1
CUILI
d~V
m LC
UUI. UC CUIIIlLUIIIU1id

114. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principalsfor Effective Banking
Supervision, [hereinafter Core Principals](visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://www.bis.org/
press/index.htm >. The 1997 financial crisis in Asia underscored the need to adopt and
observe the Core Principles. See, e.g., Reality Hits Japan, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 29,

1997, at 15.
115. See Core Principals,supra note 114.
116. See id.
117. See The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, About OECD:
W7Wt is OECD (visited Sept. 28, 1999) < http://www.oecd.org/about/general/index.htm >.
118. See The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, About OECD:
Membership, (visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/about/general/membercountries.htm>.

119. See Grabby, WALL ST. J., Sep. 18, 1996, at A18.
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because the author could not identify an American consumer who had lost
money as a direct result of Sumitomo's trading scandal. Therefore, the
Journalargued, the scandal should not cause concern in America. A lead
story in The FinancialTimes in March 1997 made a similar argument,
stating that retail investors require some protection, but market professionals
0
However, this line of reasoning fails to consider adverse effects
do not. 12
of the trading scandal on copper market participants worldwide due to the
loss of confidence in the copper futures markets.
In fact, the Sumitomo copper trading scandal imposed significant costs
on commodity exchanges and on those that rely on them. First, there is
evidence that the scandal undermined confidence in both the LME and the
Comex with respect to copper and brought about decreased trading volume
on those exchanges. 2 1 Second, financial intermediaries such as Banker's
Trust, J.P. Morgan, and American International Group that had sold put
options to copper producers in ignorance of Sumitomo's fraudulent activity
options. 122
faced extraordinary losses if copper producers exercised their put
Third, any copper producer that had not purchased enough put options to
cover its inventories may have been forced to sell, at deflated market prices,
the portion of its inventories that was not covered. 123 Fourth, the increased
volatility of copper prices resulting from the scandal is likely to have caused
copper
the premium charged for put options to rise, thereby costing
124
inventories.
copper
their
of
value
the
producers more to protect
Finally, banks that had arranged creative financing for Sumitomo's
copper trading were exposed to losses when the trading scandal surfaced.
For example, J.P. Morgan & Co. had originally loaned Sumitomo $400

120. The story argued that "there is general agreement that retail investors need
protection. But there is no case for protecting market professionals who are capable of
looking after themselves." A Slim CFTC, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 11, 1997, at 19.

121. Despite the perception of market participants that the Sumitomo incident caused a
decline in trading volume (see, e.g., Lucchetti, supra note 102) and figures cited by
NYMEX chairman Daniel Rappaport that tend to show that such a decline did occur, LME
chairman David King claimed in May 1997 that the Sumitomo incident did not cause a
decline in trading volume. Mr. Rappaport contends that the "LME has illusory numbers
that inflate the volume." Mr. Rappaport's comments were directed at copper trading in
particular, while Mr. King's comments were in reference to trading volume generally. See
Stephen Coplan, Nymex Chief Cites Copper Gain over LME, AM. METAL MARKET, Sept.
10, 1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL 8678741 and Michele Peel, LME Chief to Report
Increased Volume, FIN. TIMEs, May 21, 1997, at 42, available in 1997 WL 11029548.
122. See Edward Wyatt, With Sumitomo's Loss, U.S. Widens CommoditiesInquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 1996, at D4.
123. See id.
124. See Economic Purposes of Futures Trading, supra note 61.
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million to finance copper trading, but apparently had restructured the loan
by turning it into a security based on the payment stream expected from the
copper trading. "- On April 2, 1997, the Federal Reserve and the New
York State Banking Department reprimanded J.P. Morgan & Co. for
"careless management and control in its base metals business" following an
investigation into its relationship with Sumitomo. 126 Although reports in the
press did not provide details of the transaction, it seems that J.P. Morgan
initially issued a loan to Sumitomo that it later forgave in exchange for
rights to a payment stream linked to Sumitomo's copper trading. 127 The
bank might not have been affected by the scandal if the financing had
remained a traditional bank loan to Sumitomo Corporation, which was
supported by Sumitomo Bank and Sumitomo Trust. 128 However, if J.P.
Morgan had linked its right to receive payments to the performance of
Sumitomo's copper trading, it was exposed to a significantly lower level of
payments when prices fell after the copper trading scandal surfaced. 129
Sophisticated traders may require less protection than small investors,
but they require a significant level of protection. All participants in
professional trading markets need to be protected from systemic risk (i.e.,
activity that threatens the integrity of the markets). When a trading scandal
caused by one market participant imposes costs on suppliers, end-users, and
financial intermediaries that were not responsible for the scandal, the
sophisticated nature of their business neither reduces their losses, nor
protects against systemic risk.130 Decreased trading volume following a

125. See Federal and State Banking Regulators Reprimand J.P. Morgan, ANDREWS
Apr. 9, 1997, at 3.
126. See id. The reason for the reprimand was not disclosed in the press. By issuing a
reprimand rather than taking regulatory action, state and federal authorities implied that the
business was not fraudulent and that any loss Morgan suffered as a result of its relationship
with Sumitomo was caused by market disruptions brought about by Sumitomo's market
manipulation, not by fraudulent activity by its own employees. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Sumitomo's Two Banking Affiliates Pledge 'Full' Support, AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE, June 14, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3871311.
129. As a creditor, J.P. Morgan would have been entitled to repayment regardless of
Sumitomo's copper trading losses, and could have expected repayment even if the losses
threatened the solvency of Sumitomo because the Sumitomo banks promised to support the
trading corporation. However, as a counterparty to a financial contract, J.P. Morgan's right
to a payment stream would have been susceptible to market distortions caused by
Sumitomo's manipulative trading.
130. For example, see the testimony before Congress of John G. Gaine, of the Managed
Futures Association on April 17, 1997. Addressing proposed amendments to the
Commodity Exchange Act, Mr, Gaine stated "because our membership also bears the cost
SECURITIES & COMMODITIES LITIGATION REPORTER,
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scandal suggests that participants are not using the markets to mitigate
pricing risks to the extent that they used the markets prior to the scandal.
When parties not associated with a scandal bear significant losses because
of it, their subsequent reluctance to use the markets indicates that the
markets and the authorities that regulate them are not effectively serving
their purpose, which is to facilitate trade.
V. THE SCOPE OF AuTHoRITY OF COMMODITIES REGULATORS

Although governments and the regulators of the commodities markets
may seek to tighten their supervision of the markets after a scandal causes
catastrophic losses, they must carefully avoid over-regulating the markets.
To facilitate trade, regulators must allow markets to be efficient, and that
requires balancing regulatory principles that focus on market confidence
with deregulatory principles that focus on market efficiency. To a large
extent, legislators balance regulatory interests by creating regulatory powers
and the courts participate in this balancing by interpreting those powers.
But regulators, exchanges, and market participants also play important roles
in defining the scope of authority of commodities regulators.
A. Global CoordinationFollowing the Sumitomo Incident
On October 31, 1997, regulators of commodities markets in seventeen
jurisdictions demonstrated that they intend to help shape the scope of their
own authority by issuing the Tokyo Commodity FuturesMarkets Regulators'
Conference, which establishes regulatory "best practices.", 31 The topics
if markets lack integrity or are inefficient, we believe deregulation should be approached
knowledgeably.... The wave of incidents outside the United States, such as Barings and
Sumitomo, reminds us of the importance of some of the features of our regulatory
structure." Revision of Commodity Market Regulation:Hearingson H.R. 467 Before the
Subcomm. on Risk Management and Specialty Crops of the House Comm. on Agric., 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of John G. Gane, Managed Futures Association).
131. The seventeen adherents to the Tokyo Communiqud are: Australian Securities
Commission (Australia), Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios (Brazil), Canadian Grain
Commission (Canada), Commission des Operations de Bourse (France),
Bundesaufsichtsampt fur den Wertpapierhandel (Germany), Securities and Futures
Commission (Hong Kong), Hungarian Banking and Capital Market Supervision (Hungary),
Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Boursa (Italy), Ministry of International Trade
and Industry, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (Japan), Ministry of Finance
and Economy (Korea), Securities Commission (Malaysia), Securities Board of the

Netherlands (Netherlands), Singapore Trade Development Board (Singapore), Financial
Services Board (South Africa), Financial Services Authority (United Kingdom), Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (United States of America). See TOKYO CONFERENCE, supra
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covered by the Tokyo Conference-contractdesign, market surveillance, and
all legitimate concerns of the regulators.
information sharing 3-are
However, implementing the best practices may require them to amend their
own policies. In other instances market regulators may request that their
governments broaden their regulatory authority or even modify national
policies.
1. Contract Design
With respect to contract design, the Tokyo Conference encourages
regulators to review exchange-traded contracts to ensure that they are
designed to minimize their "susceptibility ...to abusive conduct." 133 Such
a review, while useful, implies that regulators will require more time to
approve new contracts. However, in 1997 the CFTC, under pressure to
provide efficient supervision, introduced a "fast-track" process to approve
new exchange-traded contracts.1 34 Under the fast-track process, exchanges
may obtain the CFTC's approval to trade certain new types of futures
contracts within ten days of the application date. 35 When the CFTC
proposed the fast-track rules, the exchanges generally commented that they
"did not go far enough to relieve the exchanges from the perceived
competitive burden which they argued the approval process entails. " 136 In
particular, the Chicago Board of Trade argued that the CFTC should not
review contract design at all because the exchanges should be trusted to
review new contracts. 137 Meanwhile, the Futures Industry Association,
whose members "effect [sic] more than eighty percent of all customer
transactions executed on United States contract markets," 38 supported the
that139fast-track approval
but expressed,,concern
CFTC's would
review process,
co-+-+
Jnh
wold inhibit public

'ommnt On -
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note 76, at 11.
132. Id. at 7.
133. Id. at 34.
134. See Revised Procedures for Commission Review and Approval of Applications for
Contract Market Designation and of Exchange Rules Relating to Contract Terms and
Conditions, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,434 (1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 5)
[hereinafter Revised Procedures 1].
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 10,434.
Id. at 10,435.
See id. at 10,435.
Id. at 10,438.
See id. Applications had previously been subject to a thirty day comment period.
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The CFTC did not accede to the suggestions of the exchanges, and
promulgated the fast-track rules essentially as proposed.14° However, the
exchanges continued to press for less regulatory oversight, citing
competitive pressures from foreign exchanges and the off-exchange
markets. 141 Responding to the exchanges' concerns, in July 1999 the CFTC
proposed a rule that allows the exchanges to list certain contracts for trading
prior to receiving CFTC approval. 142 In the Federal Register notice that
introduced the proposed rule, the CFTC referred to its 1994 study on global
competition. 143 The 1994 study found "no evidence that disparities in the
regulatory frameworks of various jurisdictions, including particularly
disparities in procedures for listing new contracts, were a major force
explaining the success of various exchanges in the global market." 144 The
CFTC noted that "the trend among foreign authorities has been to
strengthen their regulatory regimes." 145 However, the CFTC also
recognized that its own rules "must be responsive to changes
146 in the
"
robust.
competitively
remain
to
are
markets
U.S.
marketplace if
The proposed rules for listing contracts prior to approval seek to
balance competitive pressures with the public interest. Under the proposal,
exchanges must notify the CFTC of their intent to list a contract prior to
approval the day before the contract is listed. 14 The notice must describe
the contract's terms and conditions. 148 The CFTC noted that it will require
an exchange to amend a contract if it does not satisfy the CFTC's
regulations, and that amending an actively traded contract might require the
149
exchange to take emergency action with respect to open positions.
Therefore, the CFTC commented that listing contracts prior to approval
should be reserved for contracts that "clearly raise no legal or practical
impediments to trading. "150 By allowing exchanges to list routine contracts

140. See id.
141. See Revised Procedures for Commission Review and Approval of Applications for
Contract Market Designation and of Related to Contract Terms and Conditions, 64 Fed.
Reg. 40,528 (1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 5) [hereinafter Revised Procedures II].
142. See id.

143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 40,532.

148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id.
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prior to approval while warning them against listing complex contracts
without approval, the CFTC's proposal attempts to balance competitive
pressures and the public interest.
Although fast-track approval and listing contracts prior to approval are
arguably consistent with the public interest, they may be inconsistent with
the global best practices. Fast-track approval forces the CFTC to approve
contracts more quickly, and with less time for public comment, than it did
before it endorsed the Tokyo Conference. Listing prior to approval would
allow contracts to be traded before any public comment. However, the
exchanges generally contend that they already review their own contracts to
"minimize their susceptibility to abusive conduct,""'1 and that any CFTC
review is redundant. 152 Fast-track approval and listing prior to approval
both demonstrate the tension between the U.S. market's trend toward
efficiency and the global market's trend toward caution.
2. Market Surveillance
With respect to market surveillance, the Tokyo Conference encourages
regulators to adopt rules that will help them to monitor market activity and
to detect and investigate conduct that may be abusive or may otherwise
impair market stability. 51 3 In particular, the Tokyo Conference suggests that
regulators should develop systems to identify large exposures, including
over-the-counter positions that are related to large exchange positions.154
Such information provides a market with transparency.
A transparent market is one in which market participants have access
to information about pricing and the size of holdings. 5 5 Lack of
transparency played a central role in the 1907 United Metals market
..... -ai, ...
tulle
. panlc that mUldL
UWeU it.
"irst, because lhe copper
market was not transparent, United Metals was able to control the U.S.
156
copper supply during much of 1907 without regulatory intervention.
Second, when United Metals dumped its copper on the market in October
1907, Mr. Heinze guessed that market participants were short-selling stock
in United Copper but he did not have access to information that would

151. TOKYO

CONFERENCE,

supra note 76, at 34.

152. See generally Revised Procedures II, supra note 141.
153. See TOKYO CONFERENCE, supra note 76, at 34.

154. See id.
155. See RICHARDW. JENNINGS ET AL., SEcuRriEs REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
9 (7th ed. 1992).
156. See Tallnan & Moen, supra note 1, at 5.
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confirm his suspicions. 157 Consequently, Heinze pursued a "short-squeeze"
strategy in a market where there were few short-sellers. 158 In a transparent
securities market, Heinze would have known the volume of short-selling and
probably would not have attempted to squeeze the short-sellers. Third, after
Heinze lost a fortune through his United Copper transactions, the public
became concerned about the solvency of the banks with which he was
associated. 1 59 But because the banking market was not transparent, neither
the public nor the government had ready access to information that could
clarify which banks could remain solvent, and a bank panic ensued.' 6°
These events exposed simultaneously the dangers of a lack of transparency
in the commodities, securities, and banking markets.
With respect to commodities, the CFTC now requires traders with large
positions on U.S. commodity exchanges to report their exchange positions
each week. 161 The CFTC compiles the information in its Commitments of
62
Traders in Futures reports, which are publicly available on the Internet.1
The large trader reports add transparency to the U.S. commodities markets
where, in the past, companies like United Metals were able to manipulate
the markets with a good degree of anonymity.
In contrast to the CFTC's mandatory reporting, in 1996 the LME
permitted brokers to voluntarily report positions of their large clients, and
traders on the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange
("LIFFE") did not report their positions at all. 163 Professor Christopher
Gilbert, a "U.K. academic noted as an expert on commodity futures
markets,"164 recommended that the U.K. authorities should use the CFTC's
large trader reports as a model for monitoring market activity.1 65 Professor

157. See id. at 6.

158. See id.
159. Seeid. at4.
160. See id. at 8.
161. See, e.g., The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, The Commitments of
Traders Report, (last
calendar97.htm>.

modified

July

1996)

<http://www.cftc.gov/dea/calendar/

162. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Commitments of Traders Report,
(visited Sept. 29, 1999) <http://www.cftc.gov/dea/cot.html>.
163. See Christopher L. Gilbert, Manipulation of Metals Futures: Lessons from
Sumitomo 14 (Nov. 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with the New York Law School
Journal of Internationaland ComparativeLaw).
164. Commodity Exchange Act Revision: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Agric.,

Nutrition and Forestry, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Daniel Rappaport, Chairman, New
York Mercantile Exchange).

165. See Gilbert, supra note 163, at 14.
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Gilbert also proposed that the LME should take the extra measure of
requiring reports of physical positions (i.e., ownership of stock in LME
warehouses).'66 Professor Gilbert suggested that the U.K. authorities might
have detected Sumitomo's market manipulation much sooner if they had
required such large-trader reports. 167 Professor Gilbert's suggestions were
consistent with the market surveillance best practices that were endorsed by
the world's commodity markets68 supervisors, including the U.K.'s Financial
Services Authority ("FSA").1
Despite global recognition that market surveillance is important, and the
recognition of the CFTC's Commitments of Traders in Futures reports as a
model for market surveillance, some U.S. exchanges would like to
discontinue large-trader reporting. For example, former chairman of the
Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT") Patrick Arbor favored eliminating the
reports.' 69 During a 1997 interview with Futures magazine, Mr. Arbor
stated that the large-trader reports cost the CBOT business because
professional customers who want anonymity choose to trade "in Europe
over the United States to avoid the reports. ,171
Daniel Rappaport, chairman of the New York Mercantile Exchange
("NYMEX"), can point to Sumitomo Corporation as one customer that
NYMEX lost because of position reporting. 17 1 Yasuo Hamanaka stopped
trading directly on the New York exchange three years before his market
manipulation surfaced. 17 2 At the time, Hamanaka complained about
"onerous position reporting requirements imposed by the CFTC."1 73 While
testifying before Congress on H.R. 467, Mr. Rappaport recognized that
position reporting prevented Sumitomo's market manipulation from taking

166. See id.
167. See id. at 17.
168. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Commodity Derivatives Regulators
Publish Guidance on Strengthening the Supervision of InternationalMarkets (last modified
Oct. 31, 1997) <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press97/4072-97.htm>.
169. See Carla Cavaletti, ProfessionalMarkets:An Appealfor Change, 1 FUTURES MAG.
1, (July 1997) <http://www.futuresmag.comllibrary/july97/tradetrends.html>.
170. Id.
171. See Revision of Commodity Market Regulation, Hearings on H.R. 467 Before the
Subcomm. on Risk Management & Specialty Crops of the House Comm. on Agric. 105th
Cong. 89, 90 (1997) [hereinafter Rappaport Testimony] (testimony of Daniel Rappaport,
Chairperson, New York Mercantile Exchange).
172. See id.
173. McGee & Frank, supra note 30, at Al.
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place directly on the NYMEX, and supported the use of position reporting
for market surveillance.74

Both of the bills concerning commodities regulation that Congress
considered during 1997 would have allowed exchanges to eliminate much
large-trader reporting. As discussed below, both bills (H.R. 467 and S.
257) contained a professional market exemption that would have allowed
certain market participants to trade on and off U.S. exchanges without being
subject to many of the CFTC's regulatory protections. 175 To the extent that
the bills would have allowed exchanges to dismantle the CFTC's system for
market surveillance 176 they were inconsistent with the recently adopted
global best practices. Although neither bill was enacted, Congress is
revisiting the issues that they raised during the current CFTC
reauthorization process. If Congress amends the Commodities Exchange
Act, it should carefully consider the market surveillance best practices when
assessing the benefits and risks of a professional market exemption.
3. Information Sharing
With respect to information sharing, the global best practices encourage
regulators to share "relevant information concerning the supervision of their
respective markets, both on a routine basis and as needed, and to promote
communication among relevant personnel." 177 The Sumitomo affair
exposed a need for enhanced cooperation among regulatory authorities in
different jurisdictions. During the CFTC's fall 1995 investigation into
copper backwardation, the LME was reluctant to share information. 178 In
fact, one senior CFTC official told the Wall Street Journal that "we [the
CFTC] wanted to know much more about what was going on at the LME
or British regulators were willing to tell us. The LME
than either the LME
179
us."
stonewalled
Since the Sumitomo incident, regulatory authorities in the U.S. and
U.K. have signed a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") in which
they agreed to cooperate with each other and share supervisory

174. See Rappaport Testimony, supra note 171.
175. See H.R. 467, 105th Cong. (1997) and S. 257, 105th Cong. (1997).
176. See Revision of Commodity Market Regulation, Hearings on H.R. 467 Before the
Subcomm. on Risk Management & Specialty Crops of the House Comm. on Agric. 105th
Cong. 15 (1997) (statement of Brooksley Born, Chairperson, CFTC).
177. TOKYO CONFERENCE, supra note 76, at 34.
178. See McGee & Frank, supra note 30, at Al.
179. Id.
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information.1 80 The MOU is intended to "address potentially significant
market events experienced by US or UK securities or banking firms." '
Had the MOU been in place during the CFTC's fall 1995 copper
investigation, the LME might have been more forthcoming with information
about Sumitomo's market position. However, the value of an agreement to
share information depends on the quality and compatibility of information
possessed by the parties to the agreement. Regulators and exchanges can
only share as much information as they have. As discussed, the LME relied
on voluntary reporting of large market positions,18 2 while the CFTC had a
system of mandatory reporting. 8 3 Perhaps the LME "stonewalled" the
CFTC because it did not possess the information sought by the CFTC.
The Tokyo Conference encourages a parity of market surveillance and
information sharing among the jurisdictions of its seventeen endorsing
supervisors."8 4 The supervisors cannot attain such a parity on their own.
The CFTC is promoting enhanced market surveillance while the exchanges
that it regulates and the legislators that give it power are exploring methods
to make such surveillance less intrusive. The FSA has agreed to share
information with U.S. supervisors that U.K. exchanges may not be readily
able to provide. In other jurisdictions whose regulators endorsed the Tokyo
Conference, the principles of market surveillance and information sharing
may conflict with national policies regarding privacy. 85 Therefore, the
success of the global best practices depends on whether the authorities that
endorsed them will be allowed by their governments to develop and
maintain meaningful and compatible systems for market surveillance and
information sharing.

180n. S1e Commo:ies'- Futures Ta-di-g Commission, Me-uorundufn f Undersianding
Between the SEC, CFTC, Bank of England, andFinancialServices Authority, (last modified

Oct. 28, 1997) <http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press97/4068-97.htm>.
181. Id.

182. See Gilbert, supra note 163, at 23.
183. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, The Commitments of TradersReport,
(last modified July 1996) < http://www.cftc.gov/opa/backgrounder/cot596.html >.

184. See TOKYO CONFERENCE, supra note 76, at 5.
185. Laws which restrict information sharing are sometimes stricter in other countries
than in the U.S.

Although such laws are usually designed to protect the privacy of

individuals, they could create an environment that is wary of sharing information about
participants in the financial markets. See generally Scott Barancik, Foreign Privacy Laws
Hinder U.S. Oversight, GAO Warns, AMERICAN BANKER, Aug. 4, 1998, at 4. See also
Cavaletti, supra note 169, at 1 (quoting Chicago Board of Trade Chairman Partick Arbor
regarding large trader reports: "[Professional market participants] want anonymity-they
deserve anonymity. They feel [large trader reporting] is an invasion of their privacy, and

they subject themselves to all kinds of statutory liabilities if they do not do it right."
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B. Efforts by the Judiciaryand Congress to Define
the Scope of Commodities Regulation
While the CFTC uses the global stage to help shape the scope of its
authority in the United States, U.S. courts try to ensure that the CFTC
operates within its legislated boundaries and Congress tries to ensure that
those boundaries are appropriate.
1. The Over-the-Counter Market Exemption: Antifraud and the
Banker's Trust Cases
The Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") generally grants the CFTC
exclusive jurisdiction over "accounts, agreements . . . and transactions

involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or
executed" on CFTC-designated contract markets. 8 6 To strengthen the
CFTC's jurisdiction, the CEA makes any off-exchange dealings in such
accounts, agreements, or transactions unlawful unless exempted by the
CFTC. 8 7 In 1993, the CFTC exempted transactions commonly known as
swaps from the off-exchange prohibition, but retained any antifraud
jurisdiction that it may have had over such transactions. ' To be exempt,
a swap agreement must be 189a privately negotiated transaction between
"eligible swap participants. ,
The swaps exemption does not specifically require a principal-toprincipal relationship. Instead, it requires off-exchange swap contracts to
be between "financially sophisticated persons or institutions. "19° "Eligible
swap participant" is defined by the regulation, and generally includes
financial institutions, large corporations or other business organizations, and
any natural person with assets greater than $10,000,000.191 The CFTC's
swap exemption is based on the characteristics of each party, rather than on
the relationship between the parties to a particular contract.

186. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (1998).
187. See 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1999).
188. Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements, 58 Fed. Reg. 5587, 5588 n. 12 (1993) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 35).
189. Id.
190. Over-the-CounterDerivativesMarket, 1998: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. On
Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Brooksley Born,
Chairperson CFTC).
191. See Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements, supra note 188, at 5588.
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In crafting the swap exemption, the CFTC retained antifraud
jurisdiction contained in CEA section 6(b) and 6(o). '92 Unlike the swap
exemption itself, the CFTC's antifraud caveat to the exemption is based on
the relationship between the parties to the swap contract. Section 6(b) of the
CEA makes unlawful certain fraudulent conduct in connection with a
covered commodities contract made "for or on behalf of any other
person .. .193 Section 6(o) of the CEA prohibits a "commodity trading
advisor" from engaging in "any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or participant or
prospective client or participant. "9 With respect to any particular interest
rate swap agreement, one party would be a "commodity trading advisor" if
it advised the other party "for compensation or profit... as to the value of
or the advisability of" the agreement.' 95
The antifraud provisions of CEA sections 6(b) and 6(o) both require a
relationship that is something more than a principal-to-principal relationship.
In a pure principal-to-principal relationship, neither party would act "for or
on behalf of" the other, and neither party would act as an advisor to the
other. Therefore, such a relationship would never be subject to the
antifraud provisions of CEA section 6(b) or section 6(o).
Shortly after the swap exemption became effective, it was tested by two
cases involving Bankers Trust ("BT"). 96 Taken together, the cases
demonstrate that it is important, but sometimes difficult, to consistently
distinguish principal-to-principal relationships from advisory relationships.
In 1994, Gibson Greetings ("Gibson") suffered losses under offexchange interest rate swap contracts that it had entered into with BT. 19'
Gibson qualified as an "eligible swap participant" under the CFTC
regulation, 198 and the CFTC did not declare the contracts null and void as
A-
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determined that BT had acted in an advisory capacity with respect to

192. See id. at 5589.
193. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a) (1994).
194. 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) (1994).
195. 7 U.S.C. § la (5)(A)(i) (1998).
196. See In re BT Sec. Corp., Docket No. 95-3, 1994 WL 711224 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 22,
1994) and Procter and Gamble Co. v. Banker's Trust Co. and BT Sec. Corp., 925 F.Supp.
1270, 1274 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
197. See In re BT Sec. Corp., 1994 WL 711224, at *1.
198. Id.
199. See generally In re MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc. & MG Futures, Inc., No. 95-14, 1995
WL 447455 (C.F.T.C. July 27, 1995).
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Gibson, and ultimately fined BT $10 million for violating antifraud
provisions of the CEA. 2°° In a similar 1996 case, Procter and Gamble
("P&G") sued BT over losses caused by off-exchange interest rate swaps. 20 '
However, U.S. District Court Judge Feikens held that the antifraud
provisions of the CEA did not apply to the swap agreements between P&G
and BT.2 °2
Both the Gibson case and the P&G case involved off-exchange interest
rate swaps with the same bank. The different outcomes reflect the
sometimes difficult task of defining the relationship between parties to such
transactions. In April 1994, BT had advertised in The Economist that it had
"devised a complex long-range structure which will wash price risk right
out of [an] Asian stock market" for its "client. , 203 The advertisement
continued: "Our whole business is built on managing global risk like
this." 2 04 BT appeared to suggest that it considered itself to be an advisor to
companies that sought to manage their financial risks.
At the time when they entered into their respective contracts with BT,
Gibson and P&G both sought to reduce their sensitivity to interest rate
risk. 205 Gibson had made a large debt offering and was obliged to make
interest payments under the offering. Gibson entered into the swap
contracts to reduce its interest payments in the event that interest rates fell
below the rate that it was paying on its debt. 20 6 Although not stated in the
court's opinion, P&G probably entered into interest-rate swaps with BT for
similar reasons. In the Gibson case, the CFTC found that BT had acted as
an advisor to Gibson because BT's managing director for the Gibson
account had told his supervisor in February 1994 that Gibson "really put
themselves in our hands like 96% . . . [a]nd we have known that from day
one. ,207
In the P&G case, the court recognized that BT representatives had
"conversations with P&G regarding market conditions, past performance of

200. See In re BT Sec. Corp., 1994 WL 711224, at *5.
201. See Procterand Gamble, 925 F.Supp. 1270.
202. See id. at 1274.
203. Recalled to Life, A Survey of InternationalBanking, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 30,

1994, at 2.
204. Id.
205. See In re BT Sec. Corp., 1994 WL 711224, at *1 and Procter and Gamble, 925
F.Supp. at 1276.

206. See In re BT Sec. Corp., 1994 WL 711224, at *1.
207. Id. at 5.
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208
Treasury notes and bonds, prognostications for the future, and the like."
The court further acknowledged that BT representatives "gave P&G a sales
pitch regarding the potential benefits of their product. ' ' 209 However,
because the BT representatives also discussed P&G's view of interest rates,
the court concluded that P&G used "[its] own independent knowledge of

market conditions . . . not based on commodity trading advice . . . in
,,210
forming [its] own expectation as to what the market would do .
Thus, by discussing P&G's views of interest rates, BT representatives
transformed an advisory relationship into a principal-to-principal
relationship. After determining that P&G was a counterparty rather than a
client of BT, the court dismissed the claims that P&G brought against BT
under the CEA's anti-fraud provisions.2 '
Despite the conflict between regulators and the judiciary regarding the
relationship between parties to swap agreements, neither reform bill
considered by Congress in 1997 proposed to amend the CEA's antifraud
provisions.21 2 Many market participants agree that protection against fraud
is important. The CFTC, the End-Users Derivatives Association (EUDA),
and a speaker representing ten exchanges and self regulatory organizations
(SROs) testified during the 1997 hearings that they favored the CEA's

antifraud jurisdiction over swaps.213

The International Swaps and

Derivatives Association ("ISDA") presented a contrary opinion by asserting

208. Procterand Gamble, 925 F.Supp. at 1287.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 1286.
212. See generally H.R. 467, 105th Cong. § 102 (1997) and S. 257, 105th Cong. § 5
(1997).
213. Regarding the CFTC testimony, see Revision of Commodity Market Regulation:
Hearings on H.R. 467 Before the Subcomm. on Risk Management and Specialty Crops of
the House Comm. on Agric., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Brooksley Born,
Chairperson, CFTC). [hereinafter Born Statement]. Regarding the EUDA testimony, see
Revision of Commodity Market Regulation:Hearings on H.R. 467 Before the Subcomm. on
Risk Management and Specialty Crops of the House Comm. on Agric., 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement of William P. Miller, II, EUDA). Regarding the testimony on behalf of ten
exchanges and SROs, see Revision of Commodity Market Regulations: Hearings on H.R.
467 Before the Subcomm. on Risk Management and Specialty Crops of the House Comm.
on Agric., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of William Brodsky, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Chicago Board Options Exchange) [hereinafter Brodsky Statement]. Mr.
Brodsky testified on behalf of the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the American Stock
Exchange, the Boston Stock Exchange, the Chicago Stock Exchange, the Cincinnati Stock
Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers, the New York Stock Exchange,
the Pacific Exchange, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, and the Options Clearing
Corporation.
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that swaps should be entirely outside the scope of the CEA.2 14 ISDA
represents over 300 large institutions that deal in privately negotiated
derivatives, such as swaps. 215 During the 1997 hearings, it suggested that
swap agreements should be exempt from the CEA's antifraud provisions
regardless of whether one party to any particular agreement acted in an
advisory capacity. 216
The conflicting interpretations of the CFTC's antifraud jurisdiction
demonstrate that the 1997 proposals to amend the CEA were inadequate.
By retaining antifraud jurisdiction in a context where it is not consistently
applied, the proposals considered by Congress would have perpetuated the
disagreement regarding the CFTC's jurisdiction. Some action is necessary
to clarify the nature of the relationship between swap participants and the
scope of the CEA's antifraud provisions. Congress should consider such
action during the current CFTC reauthorization process.
2. The Professional Market Exemption
In addition to the off-exchange exemption, during the 1997 hearings
Congress considered a "professional market exemption" for the onexchange activity of sophisticated market participants. 217 The exemption
would have allowed an exchange to establish a professional market
exchange comprising institutional participants whose trading would run
parallel to the existing exchange, but outside the CFTC's jurisdiction.2 18
Exchanges estimate that under either proposal approximately 90% of
commodity exchange trading would qualify for the professional market.219
In such an environment, the Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT"), the
world's largest exchange, could eliminate the CFTC's large-trader reporting
requirements and its review of contract design. 220 Removing the CFTC's
authority over market surveillance and contract design with respect to 90 %

214. See Revision of Commodity Market Regulations: Hearings on H.R. 467 Before the
Subcomm. on Risk Management and Specialty Crops of the House Comm. on Agric., 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of ISDA) [hereinafter ISDA Statement].
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See H.R. 467, 105th Cong. § 102 (1997) and S. 257, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997).
218. See Born Statement, supra note 213.
219. See id.
220. See Revised Procedures for Commission Review and Approval of Applications for
Contract Market Designation and of Exchange Rules Relating to Contract Terms and
Conditions, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,434 (1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 5).
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of commodity exchange trading would significantly impair the CFTC's
ability to satisfy the global best practices that it recently endorsed.
During the 1997 hearings on H.R. 467, the CFTC opposed the socalled "pro-market" exemption.221 It claimed that the exemption was based
on a false notion that trading on commodity exchanges has evolved from a
retail market into one that is dominated by institutional traders, thereby
eliminating the need for regulatory protection. 22 The CFTC asserted that
commodity exchange trading was largely a wholesale market when Congress
established the CFTC in 1974 to oversee the market, and that Congress
intended the CEA to protect institutional traders. 2 3 In effect, the CFTC
argued that institutional participants require a certain degree of regulatory
protection to maintain their confidence in the markets in which they trade.
During the 1997 Congressional hearings, Brooksley Born, then
chairperson of the CFTC, emphasized the heightened need to regulate onexchange (as opposed to off-exchange) trading.224 First, exchange
transactions are cleared centrally by the exchange, whereas off-exchange5
transactions are generally cleared between the counterparties themselves.22
As evidenced by the Metallgesellschaft case, centralized clearing spreads the
risk of a large default by one counterparty throughout the entire exchange.
In contrast, default risk in an off-exchange contract is generally confined to
the counterparties to the particular contract. 2 6
Second, exchange-traded contracts are more transparent and anonymous
than privately negotiated off-exchange contracts .227 Transparency provides
exchanges with a price-discovery mechanism not present in the off-exchange
market. 22' Anonymity prevents market participants from determining the
identity or the creditworthiness of their counter-parties.229 The CFTC
asserted that its contract design and market surveillance regulations shield
dUUII~ll,
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See id.
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to ensure the integrity of anonymous market participants.23° Such measures
can be helpful to both retail and professional market participants.231
The SEC and many stock exchanges and SROs opposed the
professional market exemption as it relates to equity derivatives.232 An
example of an equity product governed by the CFTC is an index
participation whose value is based on a stock market index.233 The SEC
noted that the 1987 market break demonstrated that the commodity markets
are closely linked to the securities markets, and that a calamity in one
market is likely to have repercussions in the other.2 34

Currently, CEA

section 2(a)(1)B defines the CFTC's jurisdiction with respect to contracts
that involve securities .235 This section is commonly referred to as the ShadJohnson accord.236 It was enacted by Congress after the SEC and the CFTC
carefully negotiated the fine line that separates some commodities from
securities. According to the testimony on behalf of the stock exchanges, the
Shad-Johnson accord generally placed equity derivatives under the CFTC's
jurisdiction.237 The stock exchanges were concerned that unregulated
trading in equity derivatives could present great potential dangers to the
nation's regulated securities markets and proposed that such products be
excluded from the professional market exemption.238
The National Grain and Feed Association ("NGFA"), which represents
the professional market
opposed
a retail aspect of the market, also that
a rule which removes 90% of
exemption.239 The NGFA believed

market participants from regulation would impair liquidity on the side of the
market that remains subject to regulation. 240 The NGFA was also skeptical

230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id. See also Brodsky Statement, supra note 214.
233. For details on index participations see Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d
537 (7th Cir. 1989).
234. See Born Statement, supranote 213. For a detailed discussion on the "One Market"

theory, see DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION,

U.S. SEC.

& ExCH.

COMM'N, THE OCTOBER

1987 MARKET BREAK (1988).
235. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(i) (1994).
236. For details on the Shad-Johnson accord, see Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883
F.2d 537.
237. See Brodsky Statement, supra note 214.
238. See id.
239. See Revision of Commodity Market Regulation, Hearings on H.R. 467 Before the
Subcomm. on Risk Management & Specialty Crops of the House Comm. on Agric. 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of Kendell Keith, National Grain and Feed Association).
240. See id.
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that self-regulation by the exchanges would adequately replace CFTC
regulation. 24 1 The NGFA concern about self-regulation echoed reflections
by the House Committee on Agriculture at the time that it created the
CFTC: "self-regulation cannot be viewed in this and later decades as an
argument against greater Federal regulation. .

.

. [S]elf-regulation cannot

be permitted to be a barrier against public policy and the interests of the
American public." 242 Despite these warnings, a professional markets
exemption would allow commodity exchanges to regulate themselves with
respect to a significant portion of their activities without federal oversight.
In contrast to the views of federal regulators, stock exchanges, and
retail market participants, the CBOT favored the professional market
exemption. 243 However, its views on the professional markets manifested
the concerns of those who are suspicious of stand-alone self-regulation.
During the 1997 hearing, the CBOT testified that "All professional market
participants should be treated alike. If 'professionals only' OTC markets
are exempt from regulation, then 'professionals only' exchange markets
should be exempt too." 2 " If a professional markets exemption is created,
the exchanges could use it to eliminate much large-trader reporting and
CFTC review of proposed exchange-traded contracts. To support the
exemption, the CBOT argued that "regulatory arbitrage is driving our
business away" and that without such regulatory relief, "our markets will
disappear. ,245
The argument for the professional market exemption blurs important
distinctions between the exchanges and the OTC market, downplays the
success of U.S. commodity exchanges in recent years, and ignores the
public interest in the commodity exchanges. While the CFTC recognizes
the systemic risk that accompanies exchange trading, and the SEC
recognizes the Conection between coruiniodity exc-anges and stock
exchanges,24 6 during the 1997 hearings the CBOT dismissed the significance
of the role of the exchanges by stating that sophisticated parties should be

241. See id.
242. H.R. REP. No. 93-975, at 48 (1974).
243. See Commodity Exchange Act Revision, Hearings on S. 257 Before the Senate
Agric., Nutrition & Forestry Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Patrick H. Arbor,
Chairman, Chicago Board of Trade) [hereinafter Arbor Statement].
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Regarding the relevant views of the CFTC and the SEC, see generally Born
Statement, supra note 214.
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unregulated regardless of where they trade.24 7 Although trading volume on
the CBOT rose by 130% between 1986 and 1996, and its 1996 profits were
26 % higher than its 1995 profits, the CBOT expressed concern that the U.S.
commodity exchanges will disappear because the volume of OTC trading is
growing more rapidly than exchange trading. 24' Finally, while the CEA
explicitly recognizes the public interest in the price discovery role of the
commodity exchanges, the chairman of CBOT, in his 1997 Congressional
testimony on CEA reform, did not mention the public interest at all, and
stated that "no one has more at stake in the integrity of our markets than we
[the CBOT] do." 249 Such testimony demonstrates that some exchanges
would represent their own self-interest rather than the public interest if
federal oversight is removed.
VI. CONCLUSION

A. Accepting the Parametersof Today's Global Marketplace
When Congress created the CFTC in 1974, domestic commodity
exchanges generally dominated the U.S. commodities markets. 250 The
exchanges faced little competition from off-exchange activity because such
activity was generally illegal. 251 They faced little competition from foreign
exchanges because those exchanges generally concentrated on local
products. 2 In this environment, the CFTC developed a set of rules to
ensure that contracts traded on the exchanges were carefully designed and
subject to adequate surveillance.
During the years after the CFTC was created, financial institutions
found themselves facing competition from new sources. For example,
corporations more frequently issued debt in place of bank loans, thereby
reducing a significant source of bank assets. 3 The trend away from
traditional banking products became known as "disintermediation. "2 In

247. See Arbor Statement, supra note 243.
248. See id.

249. Id.
250. See generally Born Statement, supra note 213.
251. See generally ISDA Statement, supra note 214.
252. See generally Revised Procedures II, supra note 141.
253. See Charles Adams et al., Annex V: Globalization of Financeand FinancialRisks,

in INTERNATIONAL
(1998).
254. See id.

MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SURVEYS
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one response to disintermediation, financial institutions began to develop
products that were arguably illegal in the U.S. unless traded on a CFTCdesignated exchange. 5 5 One simple example of such a product is an
interest-rate swap, in which two parties agree to swap the payment streams
of different interest rates based on a common notional amount. To protect
products such as interest rate swaps, financial institutions sought an
exemption from the U.S. off-exchange prohibition, and also sought to
develop the products in foreign jurisdictions that did not prohibit such offexchange activity. 256 After the CFTC created the swaps exemption in 1993,
U.S. exchanges began to feel the strain of off-exchange competition. 257
If foreign exchanges were located in jurisdictions that allowed offexchange activity, then they likely felt the strain of off-exchange
competition sooner than U.S. exchanges. Some foreign exchanges were
able to counter the off-exchange threat by offering products with few
regulatory impediments.25 8 As foreign exchanges attracted new business by
providing less supervision, U.S. commodities exchanges began to argue that
CFTC supervision prevented them from competing with the foreign
exchanges and the off-exchange market. 25 9 In 1999, they continue to argue
that CFTC supervision will destroy the U.S. commodity exchanges by
driving business either offshore or off-exchange, unless such supervision is
dramatically reduced. 2 6
At the same time that the U.S. commodity exchanges argue for
regulatory relief, many U.S. financial institutions argue that the swap
exemption is not strong enough to protect the U.S. off-exchange market.261
Evidence that the swap exemption is not an airtight guarantee against CFTC
intervention includes the Metallgesellschaft case in which the CFTC
declared Metallgesellschaft's contracts illegal,2 62 the Gibson Greetings case,

255. See generally Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements, supra note 188.
256. Id.
257. See generally Rappaport Testimony, supra note 171.
258. See id.
259. See Arbor Statement, supra note 234.
260. See Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Risk Management, Research, and Specialty Crops of the House
Comm. On Agric., 106' Cong. (1999) (statement of Daniel Rappaport, Chairman, New
York Mercantile Exchange).
261. See generally Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Risk Management, Research, and Specialty Crops ofthe
House Comm. On Agric., 106' Cong. (1999) (statement of a Coalition of Investment and
Commercial Banks) [hereinafter Coalition Statement].
262. See In re MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc. & MG Futures, Inc., No. 95-14, 1995 WL
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in which the CFTC found that the contracts were legal, but that Bankers
Trust had committed fraud, 263 and finally, the CFTC's 1998 Concept
Release in which the CFTC solicited opinions about regulating off-exchange
derivatives. 264 Like the commodity exchanges, the financial institutions
argue that their business will go offshore unless they receive regulatory
relief.
Foreign exchanges and off-exchange contracts add new dimensions to
the commodities markets.
The new environment requires market
participants and their regulators first to accept the new dimensions, and then
to reassess their own role in the multi-dimensional marketplace. Rather than
reassessing their roles, many market participants reassess their market
share, which becomes diluted as the market expands. For example, the
commodities exchanges have focused on the growth of foreign exchanges
and off-exchange contracts, although their own trading activity and
profitability has steadily increased. 265 An important lesson to be learned is
that market share may not be an accurate measure of sustainable success in
today's global market.
B. Balancing Integrity and Growth in the Marketplace
Commodities market participants have been reluctant to accept the
concept of shared success. In their quest for market share, exchanges like
the CBOT and the LME seem willing to sacrifice many of the protections
that give market participants the confidence to trade on the exchanges. The
volume of metals trading on the LME rose eightfold between 1988 and
1996, but scandals such as the Sumitomo affair marred that growth period
and subjected the LME to allegations of lax supervision by regulators of and
participants in the commodities markets. 26
The LME's growth was probably fueled in part by regulatory arbitrage,
as the Chicago Board of Trade suggests.2 67 However, an exchange that
sacrifices its integrity to enhance its growth does not create a valid argument
for widespread deregulation. Such an approach would discount to zero the
value of market confidence, which is the lynchpin that holds financial

447455 (C.F.T.C. July 27, 1995).
263. See In re BT Sec. Corp., Docket No. 95-3, 1994 WL 711224 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 22,
1994).

264.
265.
266.
267.

See Over-the-Counter Derivatives, supra note 78.
See generally Born Statement, supra note 213.
See McGee & Frank, supra note 30, at Al.
See Arbor Statement, supra note 243.
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markets together and is inseparable from the integrity of a market's
participants.
Like the commodity exchanges, financial institutions that trade financial
derivative contracts over the counter see relaxed supervision as a key to
growth. Such institutions may feel threatened when the CFTC declares that
a party to a swap contract is not an eligible swap participant, or that a party
to a swap contract has committed fraud. To protect the "legal certainty" of
swap contracts, they argue, the CFTC should have no authority to
intervene. 26 ' Although such "legal certainty" may protect a particular
contract if it is challenged in court, it does little to protect confidence in the
integrity of the markets. A more appropriate goal might be certainty that
legitimate off-exchange activity is not tainted by contracts with ineligible
participants or by fraud among eligible participants.
To respond to a growth strategy based on lax supervision, regulators
should reduce opportunities for regulatory arbitrage through coordinated
regulation. With respect to the commodity exchanges, regulators have
sought coordination by endorsing global best practices. With respect to offexchange contracts, some degree of coordinated regulation is necessary to
protect market confidence, however rules that are appropriate for the
exchanges may not be appropriate for off-exchange contracts. Nevertheless,
regulatory authorities cannot allow reduced supervision to be used as an
advantage in competing for business that should be conducted on an
exchange. Therefore, the law must clearly distinguish the types of contracts
that must be traded on exchanges from those that are suitable for offexchange trading.269

Finally, as Congress evaluates commodities regulation, it must
remember that the United States is a world leader in financial security and
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always exist. The lowest degree of supervision may initially attract
significant business, but market confidence tends to shift the balance toward
properly supervised markets .27° The current CFTC reauthorization marks

268. See Coalition Statement, supra note 261.
269. See, e.g., Reauthorizationof the Commodity FuturesTrading Commission, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Risk Management, Research, and Specialty Crops of the House
Comm. On Agric., 106'h Cong. 190 (1999) (testimony of Daniel Rappaport, Chairman, New
York Mercantile Exchange). Mr. Rappaport testified that the "marketplace has evolved into

a situation where 90 percent of the trades that are taking place in the energy OTC market
are exchange look-a-like contracts, basically the exact same contract that [NYMEX is]
trading, just taking place between very sophisticated players with very high or relatively
high credit ratings that are willing to assume each other's counterparty credit risk." Id.

270. See e.g, Rappaport Testimony, supra note 171, at 93. Daniel Rappaport, Chairman
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a critical time for U.S. financial regulation. Congress must balance the
sometimes competing interests of integrity and growth in the marketplace.
In doing so, it should carefully consider the coordinated approach endorsed
by the world's commodities regulators, evaluate the role that commodities
exchanges play in today's business environment, and question the value of
self-regulation absent meaningful federal oversight.

of the New York Mercantile Exchange said during the H.R. 467 hearings: "In terms of
Sumitomo, the market activity on COMEX actually increased after all the market
manipulative activity occurred around the LME and over-the-counter. None actually
occurred on COMEX." Id. See also Reauthorizationof the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Risk Management, Research, and Specialty
Crops of the House Comm. On Agric., 106 Cong. 217, 218 (1999) (testimony of Ronald
Hersch, Chairman, Futures Industry Association). Ronald Hersch, Chairman of the
Futures Industry Association said during the May 1999 CFTC Reauthorization Hearings:
"I don't believe that you can ever expect the United States to enact regulations to the lowest
common denomimator. . . . When institutional customers transact business on certain
exchanges, they are aware that the risks of trading on those exchanges and transacting
business on those exchanges is not the same as it would be on the U.S. exchanges." Id.

